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Political Leadership and the Security Policy: 
Negotiations on the US Military Bases 
in Okinawa under the Murayama 
and Hashimoto Cabinets
The problem of the US military bases, including the relocation of the Futenma 
military air station and a construction of a Futenma replacement facility (FRF) 
in Okinawa, has been a difficult and contested issue in Japanese domestic and 
foreign affairs for decades. In November 1995 Prime Minister Murayama and 
Vice President Al Gore established a Special Action Committee on Okinawa for 
deliberation on the reduction and realignment of the military bases. In April 1996 
President Clinton and PM Hashimoto decided on the relocation and construction 
of the FRF in the prefecture within five to seven years. As of 2015 the prospects for 
implementation seem dim, especially after the electoral victory of the anti–base 
governor Onaga Takeshi in November 2014. This article focuses on the decision–
making process under two consecutive prime ministers, Murayama and Hashi-
moto, since it was during their premiership that the issue was set on the agenda 
and decided upon. The article argues that on one hand PM Murayama made 
several important decisions, but lacking enough experience and power as a minor 
coalition member, as well as due to short term in office, was not able to supervise 
implementation of his decisions. On the other hand, PM Hashimoto did exercise 
strong leadership in regard to Futenma Air Base, but as the LDP president his de-
cisions run along the general policy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who is in charge 
of the foreign policy formation on daily base. Furthermore, the American side 
agreed to the relocation since the benefits – a new and technologically advanced 
facility for the US army, entirely paid by the Japanese government, outweighed 
the hardship of the transfer. In the entire process, the Okinawan community, 
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demanding removal of the bases outside the prefecture, was not consulted and 
hence the ongoing opposition to the US bases and FRF. 
Keywords: Foreign and defense policy, Futenma, military bases, decision making, 
prime minister role
1. Introduction
With the election of the new Okinawa governor in November 2014, 
Onaga Takeshi, who opposes the construction of a new American military 
base in Henoko to replace the existing US Marine Corps Air Station Fut-
enma (MCAS Futenma), the issue of military bases in Okinawa once again 
surfaced in Japanese politics, antagonizing local–central relations. The new 
prefectural government and local citizens stage protests and block national 
government’s decisions, preventing construction of the new base, the Fut-
enma replacement facility (FTR). On Sunday May 17, 2015, which marked 
43rd anniversary of the Okinawa reversion to Japan, 35,000 people gathered 
in Naha to express opposition to the national government’s policies toward 
Okinawa (Okinawa Times, 2015.5.18). The situation, with the anti–base 
governor and mass protests, bring back memories of the events in 1995–
1996, which resulted in the establishment of the Special Action Committee 
on Okinawa (SACO) and decision to relocate the Futenma airbase. The 
consequences of the present situation are to be seen, but in order to deepen 
the understanding of the problem, as well as to allow some predicaments 
for the future, this article aims to analyze the decision–making process on 
the US military bases and the return of the Futenma Air Station under the 
Murayama and Hashimoto cabinets in 1995 and 1996, since it was during 
their premiership that the issue was set on the agenda and decided upon. 
Furthermore, the analysis might shed some light on later developments 
on the same issue under Hatoyama and following cabinets. This historical 
analysis is to allow answers to following research questions: Who are the 
main actors and factors infulencing the decision–making process? What is 
the role of prime ministers, who historically have shown leadership in for-
eign policy, and what institutional tools have prime ministers used in the 
process under investigation? And furthermore, what was the role of other 
actors (coalition partners, bureaucrats)? The main focus is placed on the do-
mestic institutions and practices, while the American influence is analyzed 
through specific effects it had on Japanese actors. 
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2. Outline of the Problem
The problem of the US military bases in Okinawa, including the Fu-
tenma Air Station, located in the densely populated area in Ginowan 
city, has been a difficult and contested issue in Japanese domestic and 
foreign affairs for decades, but in September 1995 it gained a new mo-
mentum. On September 4, a 12–year old schoolgirl was abducted on her 
way back from school and raped by three US servicemen, who escaped 
later back into their base. The news about the rape and later reports about 
problems of the Japanese police to get a hold of custody of the suspects led 
to an outburst of protests by local citizens, escalating into demands not 
only to revise the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the second most 
important document after the Japan–US Security Treaty, which stipulates 
conditions of operation of the American military bases and the army on 
Japanese territory, but also to close and move the US military bases out-
side Okinawa. The scale and intensity of the protests made both govern-
ments, political commentators and the media fear that the alliance itself 
might be at stake, as epitomized by such expressions as “alliance adrift” 
(dōmei hyōryū). 
For both governments, the Okinawa situation was of the utmost im-
portance because the prefecture hosts close to 74% of the exclusive–use 
US military bases, which occupy over 18% of the main island of Okina-
wa, and 70% of the American forces (Okinawa Ken 2013, pp. 1–3), while 
at the same time Okinawa constitutes only 0.6% of Japanese territory. 
The density of the military facilities and personnel have posed serious 
dangers to local citizens, resulting in accidents, noise and environmental 
pollution, assaults, rapes and other problems, and most importantly to 
the perception of discrimination in comparison to the rest of the country. 
When the rape happened in September 1995, the national govern-
ment was led by Socialist Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi (April 30, 
1994 – November 1, 1996), the first head of the Socialist Party of Japan 
(SPJ, renamed in January 1996 to Social Democratic Party of Japan, SDPJ) 
to hold this position since 1948. What was more remarkable is the fact 
that the Socialists created the cabinet in coalition with their long–stand-
ing archrival, the Liberal Democratic Party, presided over at that time by 
Kōno Yōhei, and since October 1995 by Hashimoto Ryūtarō. On the other 
hand, on the local level the government of Okinawa was in the hands 
of the progressive and anti–base governor Ōta Masahide (December 10, 
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1990 – December 9, 1998), who after the rape began a legal battle with 
central government by refusing to sign a land lease for the American bases 
(Bochorodycz 2010, pp. 93–97). 
Under the pressure of local protests, Vice–President Al Gore on behalf 
of President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Murayama announced the 
establishment of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in 
November 1995, which by April the following year prepared the interim 
report with proposals of realignment, reduction and closure of US bases 
in Okinawa. Along the lines President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister 
(PM) Hashimoto Ryūtarō, who replaced Murayama in January 1996 (in 
office till July 30, 1998), announced in April of that year the relocation of 
the Futenma base within five to seven years. Later, to the surprise of local 
citizens, it was clarified that the construction of the Futenma Replace-
ment Facility (FRF) was to be located within the prefecture.1 After more 
deliberation the site was selected in Henoko, located in the north–western 
part of the main island of Okinawa. The situation got further complicat-
ed when in December 1997 citizens of Nago city voted against the FRF 
construction in a  non–binding referendum, after which the city mayor 
Higa Tetsuya decided nevertheless to accept the governmental proposal 
and resigned soon after. Thousands of millions of yen in subsidies were 
poured subsequently into the northern area of the Okinawa island for 
economic development to compensate for the construction of the base, 
while the newly elected mayor in February 1998, agreed to the FTR con-
struction under certain conditions. In February 1998, almost two years 
after the agreement on the Futenma relocation, governor Ōta announced 
his objection to the relocation within the prefecture, and in November 
1998, lost the election to Inamine Keiichi, who gave his consent for the 
construction, although again under certain conditions. In the end, the 
local community was split even deeper between the proponents (benefi-
ciaries of subsidies, political and business elites, construction companies) 
and opponents of the bases. In 2010 anti–base mayor Inamine Susumu 
was elected in Nago city and in 2014 reelected, while in national elections 
in the same year all seats from the Okinawa district to the Upper House 
were taken by candidates opposing the bases. Finally, in November 2014 
the anti–base candidate Onaga Takeshi became a governor and the stale-
mate continues still. As of Autumn 2015, all Okinawa related municipal 
1 Ota supposedly knew about the transfer within the prefecture from the beginning 
(Funabashi 1999, p. 3). 
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and prefectural governments are in the hands of people opposing the con-
struction of new military bases in the prefecture. Summing up, over the 
period of almost twenty years, the overall resistance against the bases re-
mained strong among the general public, while the local authorities, both 
prefectural and municipal, have been changing their stance, depending 
on the outcomes of the election, which became a battlefield between the 
opponents and proponents, the latter strongly supported by the central 
government. 
3. Main Actors
Let us begin with the analysis of the main actors involved and their 
interests. There are basically three groups on the Japanese side that should 
be considered in relation to foreign and defense policy: the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Defense (MOD, Defense Agency, DA, 
till 2007), and PM with his entourage referred to in Japanese usually as 
Kantei. The fourth external actor in the case of Okinawa is the US. Each 
of these actors can further be subdivided into subgroups, representing dif-
ferent structures, priorities and interests. 
The Prime Minister and Kantei
It has been assumed that generally Japanese PMs, with some excep-
tions, have played a limited role in policy making, including foreign af-
fairs, which was dominated by the bureaucracy, as epitomized by such 
term as “bureaucracy cabinet system” (Iio 2008, pp. 29–34; Hayao 1993, 
pp. 3–27; Shinoda 2004, p. 5; Zakowski 2015, pp. 16–21). One of the 
reasons was a lack of institutional tools, namely the limited number of 
staff working directly under the PM and personally loyal to him2, and 
furthermore, relatively small impact of international issues on electoral 
results and weak interest groups domestically in this area. Nevertheless, 
PMs did exercise a leadership in regard to chosen issues, such as the often 
quoted PM Tanaka Kakuei in 1972 in the case of the normalization of 
diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, or PM Koizumi 
Jun’ichirō in case of North Korea. The administrative reforms initiated by 
PM Hashimoto under a slogan of increased efficiency of the public admin-
2 All prime ministers in Japan have been men so far, and hence the use of a pronoun “he.” 
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istration to be achieved through a decrease of its size and cost, was among 
other aims also to strengthen the position of the PM, and particularly of 
the Kantei vis–à–vis the bureaucrats and their ministries. Kantei is an 
abbreviation of the “Prime Minister’s Residence” (Naikaku Sōri Daijin 
Kantei), which includes the PM’s personal office and the Cabinet Secre-
tariat (Naikaku Kanbō). Formally the PM’s Office (Sōrifu) and the Cabinet 
Secretariat had approximately 200 staff, although the problem was that 
a great majority of them were dispatched from other ministries, to which 
they usually stayed loyal3. International affairs were handled by the 
Cabinet Office on External Affairs (Gaisei Shingishitsu)4 in the Cabinet 
Secretariat, which personnel again were dispatched from MOFA. A great 
majority of Kantei’s staff were therefore bureaucrats. Under PM Muraya-
ma, the post of the Chief Cabinet Secretary was held by Nosaka Kōken 
(1924–2004), while under PM Hashimoto, by Kajiyama Seiroku5. At the 
same time, the post of the administrative deputy chief cabinet secretary 
was in hands of Furukawa Teijirō, who remained there for eight years and 
seven months between February 1995 and September 2003, much longer 
than that of any of the political appointees, which is quite symbolic for 
the power and influence the bureaucrats exercise in Japan. Furukawa was 
in touch with the Vice–Governor Yoshimoto Masanori, who was the main 
channel of communication between Ota and the central government (Fu-
nabashi 1999, pp. 134–136). 
PM Hashimoto was perceived as a strong leader and a skillful player 
both within his own party, the LDP, and in dealing with bureaucrats, hav-
ing held the most important ministerial and party positions (Tamura, ed. 
1998; Funabashi 1999, p. 8; Takenaka 2006, pp. 45–46). In June 1996, 
PM Hashimoto created three posts of special advisors to the PM (naika-
ku sōri daijin hosakan)6 for support in policymaking (which in 2001 was 
increased to five). In the period discussed, Okamoto Yukio was formally 
3 The PM was supported directly by a  small number of assistants, including the (a) 
chief cabinet secretary (naikaku kanbō chōkan), (b) deputy chief cabinet secretaries: 
one administrative (jimu fukuchōkan) and one politically nominated (seimu fukuchō-
kan), and (c) five prime minister’s private secretaries (naikaku sōri daijin hishokan), of 
which only one was political and four administrative, which means that the four were 
bureaucrats.
4 Under the 2001 administrative reforms it was incorporated under the Assistant Chief 
Cabinet Secretary (Naikaku Kanbō Fukuchōkanho). 
5 According to Moriya, Kajiyama was the key player in negotiations with the US on the 
return of Futenma, although he does not specify in what regard (Moriya 2010, p. 5). 
6 The function actually existed informally since 1993, created by PM Hosokawa. 
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appointed a special advisor on Okinawa to PM Hashimoto in November 
1996, a post he held till March 10, 1998. Okamoto was an ex–bureau-
crat, who served in MOFA’s North American Bureau before becoming an 
independent political commentator and an analyst. Interestingly, even be-
fore the formal establishment of the post, PM Hashimoto used another 
person as his special envoy to Okinawa, who without any formal powers 
served as a mediator and coordinator between the PM and local govern-
ment (Ryūkyū Shinpō, 1996.9.11, 1996.11.2). It was Shimokōbe Atsushi, 
the high ranking ex–bureaucrat, who at the end of the 1970s served as the 
administrative vice minister (kokudo jimujikan), the highest bureaucratic 
post in the National Land Agency (NLA), and was involved not only in 
the formulation of national land development plans (Zensō),7 but also in 
the Okinawa Promotion and Development Plans, having thereby broad 
connections in Okinawa. Shimokōbe was asked by the PM to become 
his advisor as soon as in February 1996, soon after the formation of the 
Hashimoto Cabinet, but he refused on the grounds that he wanted to 
participate in the process taking “the perspective of the Okinawan side” 
and not the national government (Shimokōbe Ākaibusu 2014, p. 29). He 
visited Okinawa on several occasions to meet with Governor Ōta Masa-
hide, Vice Governor Yoshimoto Masanori, and other persons. At the same 
time, the chief cabinet secretary, Kajiyama Seiroku, although trusted by 
PM Hashimoto, was not the closest aid but rather a strategically appoint-
ed party member (Mikuriya and Makihara, eds. 2012, p. 204; Funabashi 
1999, p. 133). For the specific tasks and negotiations, Hashimoto used his 
private advisors. 
On the other hand, PM Murayama also appointed three special ad-
visors (shushō tokubetsu hosa) in October 1994 without any legal basis, 
all of whom were members of parliament (MPs): Hayakawa Masaru (SPJ), 
Nishikōri Atsushi (Shintō Sakigake), and Nakagawa Hidenao (LDP), who 
resigned in September 1995 and was replaced by Toida Saburō (LDP). 
None of them, however, served as a mediator in regard to Okinawa policy, 
and as can be seen by the party affiliation, they were chosen to balance the 
coalition partners’ influence on the PM. 
It is important to note that in spite of the lack of formal tools such 
as the posts of special advisors, both PMs were able to use the informal 
means to influence the process. And it is not certainly a coincidence that 
7 Abbreviation of Zenkoku Sōgō Kaihatsu Keikaku (All–Japan Comprehensive Develop-
ment Plans), which were formulated between 1962 and 2005. 
Beata Bochorodycz96
both special advisors of PM Hashimoto were former ex–bureaucrats. Fur-
thermore, both PMs were very much interested in the Okinawa issue, 
having strong personal ties, and “deep sentiments” (atsui omoi) toward 
Okinawa, as in fact many of the cabinet and party members had at that 
time.8 Murayama, the Socialist PM, was also an old friend of Vice Gov-
ernor Yoshimoto Masanori, the policy brain of Governor Ōta, from the 
Jichirō, shared the critical stance toward the US–Japan security treaty and 
the stationing of the US military on Japan’s territory. Hashimoto on the 
other hand, was deeply engaged in the Okinawa problem, partly due to 
his political mentor, former PM Satō Eisaku, who negotiated the return 
of Okinawa to Japan in 1972,9 and other reasons, including his general 
interest in security issues (Okimoto and Miyagi, eds. 2013). As the PM 
and party president, he declared the resolution of the so–called “Okinawa 
problem” as a “mission” not only for himself but also for the LDP during 
a  ceremony, commemorating the party’s 40th anniversary (Tamura, ed. 
1998, pp. 118–119). 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOFA has been pointed out as the key actor responsible for foreign 
policy formulation (Yakushiji 2003, pp. 197–207), characterized, as all 
other ministries, by a strong sectionalism, secretiveness, protection of its 
privileges, and loyalty toward their home ministry. MOFA bureaucrats, 
both from the elite and non–elite tracks, recruited from graduates of Ja-
pan’s top universities, and usually continued working in the ministry till 
their retirement, with the ultimate goal of obtaining the ambassadorial 
position (Imazato 2002, p. 211). MOFA officials are said to be character-
ized by high self–esteem, coming from their proficiency in foreign languag-
es, as well as their division into separate schools, representing different 
countries, strategic for Japanese diplomacy. The most important has been 
the American school due to the relevance of the Japan–US alliance, others 
include the China and Soviet/Russian schools, the latter more influential 
8 The Okinawa sympathizers (Okinawa shinpa) or Okinawa experts (Okinawa tsū), in-
cluding Hashimoto Ryūtarō, Kajiyama Seiroku, Nonaka Hiromu, Yamanaka Sadanori 
etc., referred to as persons with a long history of involvement with the Okinawan is-
sues, with a deep understanding of local characteristics, and positive attitude towards 
the prefecture (Bochorodycz 2010, pp. 36–37). 
9 Hashimoto supposedly even kept a photograph of Satō Eisaku on his desk (Tamura ed. 
1998, p. 118). 
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during the Cold War. The bureaucrats in charge of those areas not only 
spoke the language, knew the culture, history and political system, but 
also personally sympathized with those countries as well as their political 
ideologies (Imazato 2002, pp. 187–189). 
Due to the importance of the US for Japan, it is not surprising that 
among MOFA’s ten bureaus, five in charge of different regions (Asia, North 
America etc.), and five divided functionally: Foreign Policy, Economic Af-
fairs, International Cooperation, Treaties (International Legal Affairs from 
2001), and the Intelligence and Analysis Service, until the administrative 
reforms in 2001 the most influential were the North American Affairs Bu-
reau (Hokubei Kyoku) and the Treaties Bureau (Jōyaku Kyoku). The former 
was in charge of relations with the US, while the latter with legal issues 
related to all diplomatic relations of Japan. During PM Murayama, the 
post of foreign minister went to Kōno Yōhei, the LDP president, who also 
acted as the deputy prime minister, while under PM Hashimoto to Ikeda 
Yukihiko (1937–2004). During that period of the two cabinets, the post 
of the administrative vice minister (gaimu jimujikan) was in the hands of 
Hayashi Sadayuki, and the North American Bureau, Orita Masaki, while 
the North American Bureau was led by Tanaka Hitoshi (1996–1998), one 
of the best known diplomats in Japan, particularly in regard to the rela-
tions with North Korea.10  
The Ministry of Defense
The situation of MOD was quite different from MOFA and other ad-
ministrative units. Until 2007, it was not a full–fledged ministry, but an 
agency, the DA under the PM’s Office, staffed mostly with civil servants 
dispatched from other ministries, Ministry of Finance (MOF) and Min-
istry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, later METI). The situ-
ation of the DA, regarded as the “management agency” rather than the 
“policy agency,” started changing after the Cold War, and particularly after 
the Gulf War and increased demands for Japan’s participation in interna-
tional military operations. The most important unit within MOD is the 
Defense Policy Bureau with the Defense Policy Division (the Japan–US 
Defense Cooperation Division was separated from the Defense Policy Di-
10 According to Yakushiji, Tanaka played the major role in the negotiations on the 
Futenma return (Yakushiji 2003, p. 15), although Funabashi, not denying his skills, 
shows his role differently (Funabashi 1999, pp. 39–42). 
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vision a few months after the ministry upgrading). Compared with other 
ministries and agencies, it is relatively low in esteem and staffed with 
junior personnel. 
In the discussions on Japan’s defense policy, for a long time the role 
of the bureaucrats from the DA/MOD was mentioned only slightly, while 
the focus was placed on the role of MOFA, PMs or the international en-
vironment (Blais 2010, loc. 404).11 During the period discussed in this 
paper, the ministry was still an agency, and the important posts of DA 
director–general was held by Etō Seishirō (August 1995 – January 1996), 
Usui Hideo (January 1996 – November 1996), and Kyūma Fumio (No-
vember 1996 – July 1998), who played a relatively small role in the deci-
sion–making process on Futenma. On the other hand, the negotiations 
were greatly influenced by the DA director general of Defense Bureau, 
Akiyama Masahiro (1995–1997) and the director of the Defense Policy 
division, Moriya Takemasa (1994–1995), both of whom continued their 
activities related to Futenma on different posts, Akiyama as the adminis-
trative vice minister in the DA, and Moriya as a counselor in the Cabinet 
Secretariat. Moriya, the DA/MOD administrative vice minister from 2003 
to 2007, who was eventually found guilty by the court of a bribery, wrote 
several books disclosing information on the behind the scene negotiations 
on military bases, shading some light on the process (Moriya 2010).12 
4. Institutional Arrangements for Decision Making 
Over the US Bases in Japan
Until the end of the Cold War the issue of the US military bases in 
Japan was predominantly in the hands of the US government. The situa-
tion started to change with the end of the Cold War. In 1990, the US side 
agreed to upgrade the “unequal” level of participants of the Security Con-
sultative Committee (SCC, Nichibei Anzen Hoshō Kyōgi Iinkai) on the 
American side13, which is established under the Article IV of the US–Ja-
11 (loc.) refers to the location in a Kindle edition of books. 
12 Moriya writes about a period between 2004 and 2007, but his references and descrip-
tion of processes and mechanism of the decision making on the Futenma issue, can 
be regarded as representative for a much longer period of time. 
13 The proposition came from Abe Shintarō, former Japanese Foreign Minister in June 
1990, but was ignored until the new administration of Bill Clinton picked it up in 
March 1994 (Sunohara 2011, pp. 111–114). 
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pan Security Treaty, as the highest inter–governmental organ on the US–
Japan security issues (Armacost 1996, p. 95; Yoshida 2012, pp. 298–303). 
The new members were to include the Secretaries of Defense and State, 
instead of the US Pacific Commander and US Ambassador to Japan. The 
first meeting took place in 1994, and since then the Committee has been 
also known as 2+2 Meeting due to the fact that it consists of four top 
representatives, two from each country, Foreign and Defense Ministers 
on the Japanese side, and the Secretaries of State and Defense on the 
American side. The four members are elected politicians, making the final 
decisions, but on the day to day basis, since the 1990s the negotiations 
and decisions are made by two sub–committees: Security Sub–Committee 
(SSC, Nichibei Anzen Hoshō Kōkyū Jimu Reberu Kyōgi) and Sub–Defense 
Committee (SDC, Bōei Kyōryoku Shoiinkai), which comprise high–level 
officials from both governments, the former of vice–ministers and under-
secretaries, the latter of chiefs of bureaus and deputy assistant secretaries.
Formally though, problems induced by the bases and the implementa-
tion of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) falls under the jurisdiction 
the US–Japan Joint Committee (Nichibei Gōdō Iinkai), established under 
the Article XXV of SOFA, while on the day to day basis it was the Defense 
Facilities Agency (DFA), the outer bureau of the Defense Agency that han-
dled matters related to the American army facilities, land, Japanese base 
workers, noise reduction countermeasures, accidents and incidents caused 
by the US Army service members and their families. The US–Japan Joint 
Committee manages the widest range of problems and comprises several 
permanent sub–committees created for a  specific purpose.14 At present 
the committee includes a large group of participants from the directors’ 
general rank on the Japanese side, with the Director General of the North 
American Affairs Bureau in MOFA, and not MOD, as should be noticed, 
supervising the committee.
The big institutional changes came again in November 1995, when 
under the Murayama Tomiichi Cabinet, two new bodies were established: 
on November 17, Okinawa Base Problem Council (Okinawa Kichi Mon-
dai Kyōgikai), and two days later on November 19, the Special Action 
Committee on Okinawa (SACO). The latter was the result of the inter-
governmental agreement between PM Murayama on his initiative and 
Vice President Al Gore during their meeting in Tokyo. On the other hand, 
14 The subcommittees include: the Facilities Sub–Committee (FSC), Joint Planning 
Committee (JPC), and Joint Interoperability Coordinating Committee (JICC).
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the Okinawa Base Problem Council, composed of the Chief Cabinet Sec-
retary, Foreign Minister, Director General of the DA, and the Governor 
of Okinawa, was to create a  forum for the local government to deliver 
opinions and requests, and for the central government to grasp the reality 
of bases in order to reflect them in the national policy. The council was 
the first ever such arrangement to include local representatives, and in 
that sense was revolutionary. At the same time, however, the council was 
not meant as a forum for discussions on plans for base closures and relo-
cations, had no discretionary powers over the bases or included adminis-
trative representatives from the important ministries, such as MOFA and 
DA bureaucrats, nor the American side. 
On the other hand, SACO was the intergovernmental institution, es-
tablished with the purpose to develop recommendations on ways to realign 
and reduce US facilities in Okinawa after the outburst of protests against 
the rape of a schoolgirl by the US Army servicemen. The agenda of SACO 
was to include: “planning for realigning, consolidating, and down–scaling 
the facilities and areas in Okinawa; second, problems, such as training, 
noise, safety and the environment, relating to the facilities and the areas 
of United States Forces stationed on Okinawa” (MOFA 1995). Important-
ly, SACO was established directly under the competence of the Security 
Consultative Committee (SCC, 2+2), and not the US–Japan Joint Com-
mittee, that is under political leadership, and not the routine bureaucratic 
management, due to the significance of the issue at the time. SACO was 
the first of such committees ever established outside the existing frame-
work. Nevertheless, the representatives of the local government were not 
included, and all the other members were in fact bureaucrats. 
5. Murayama Cabinet
The issue of the US military bases in Okinawa surfaced during the 
term of Murayama Tomiichi, the Socialist PM, and hence one could ex-
pect strong initiative on the part of the PM in this regard. And initially it 
did seem as the case. Murayama declared that he would risk “the life of 
his cabinet to resolve the Okinawa problem” (Ryūkyū Shimpō, 1995.11.4), 
and even established two aforementioned important institutions for delib-
eration on the military bases. Murayama was also the one who brought 
up the issue of the US military bases in Okinawa during his first meet-
ing with President Bill Clinton in January 1995, that is before the rape 
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incident, presenting several demands, including transfer of the live–fire 
artillery training over the Prefectural Route 104 and others (Yakushiji, 
ed. 2012, p. 244). However, lacking political resources in the coalition, 
as well as generally feeling uncomfortable with foreign affairs, as he con-
fessed years later (Yakushiji, ed. 2012, pp. 248–249), Murayama left the 
matter of the Okinawa bases almost entirely to Foreign and Deputy Prime 
Minister Kōno Yōhei. Kōno, the LDP president at that time, was a strong 
supporter of the Japan–US alliance and hence his efforts concentrated on 
limiting adverse effects of local protests on the alliance. The Socialist Par-
ty of Japan (SPJ) soon after becoming the ruling party in 1994 changed 
its policy dramatically, accepting the Japan–US alliance, nuclear power, 
constitutionality of Self Defense Forces, and then altering its name to the 
Social–Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) in January 1996. The party sup-
ported the Okinawan claim to reduce and return the US military bases, 
but its position in the coalition government with 70 seats against 223 of 
the LDP in the Lower House was very weak. Furthermore, Murayama had 
never held any ministerial position before becoming PM, and hence his 
knowledge of and experience in dealing with bureaucrats was very limited. 
SOFA Revision
The rape of the schoolgirl took place on September 4, 1995, but the 
Police did not want to go public to protect the girl’s identity, and it was 
not until September 8, when the Ryukyu Shinpō, one of two influential 
local newspapers, ran the story about the rape. The newspaper informed 
that the three men were held in custody by the US’s Naval Criminal In-
vestigation Service (NCIS), while the prefectural police had requested the 
Americans to be handed over to Okinawan custody. Further news about 
the refusal to hand over the suspects due to Article 17 of SOFA led to crit-
icism of the “unequal” provision, which stipulates that the accused person 
should remain under the US authorities, if it is in the hands of the US, 
until the person is charged by Japan. The protest against the rape and the 
military bases continued escalating from demands for a complete review 
of SOFA, through demands for the reduction and closure of the bases up 
to demands for withdrawal of the Marines. 
From the beginning, US authorities, and particularly the Department 
of Defense, were alarmed of possible adverse consequences of the protests. 
The US position (the Defense and State Departments, the US Embassy in 
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Japan) was firmly against SOFA revision, as expressed by Professor Joseph 
Nye, the Assistant Secretary for Defense, in the words: “We will not touch 
one letter of the text. We will deal with it as a question of Article 17 inter-
pretation and implementation” (in Funabashi 1999, p. 306). The US side 
argued that in fact SOFA was not disadvantageous to Japan, fearing that 
in case of revision the question of balance with other countries, especially 
South Korea, already voicing their dissatisfaction with SOFA, would be-
come an issue. To handle the situation apologies were offered on different 
levels, and later a stand–down of the Marines announced for a day of re-
flection. On September 11, the US Consul–General in Okinawa, Aloysius 
O’Neill visited Governor Ota Masahide at the prefectural office to offer an 
apology for the incident. On September 21, Ambassador Walter Mondale 
met the Governor in Tokyo, and apologized to the victim, her family, and 
the Okinawan people, while on the same day in the US, President Clinton 
expressed deep regret in a radio address (Ryūkyū Shinpō 1995.9.11, 21). 
Furthermore, upon complaints from Foreign Minister Kōno Yōhei, the 
Americans also agreed to late–night questioning of the suspects, which 
speeded up the process of evidence gathering. As a result, the three ma-
rines were charged by the Naha district court on September 29, eight days 
after the papers had been forwarded from the prefectural police, and on 
the same day the three marines were handed over into Japanese custody. 
The Americans showed that they were eager to cooperate but only as far 
as the problem of the SOFA Article 17 was treated as a question of “inter-
pretation and implementation.” 
On the Japanese side, MOFA and the DA also expressed strong op-
position to SOFA revision under a slogan of not opening Pandora’s Box. 
Foreign Minister Kōno, with a sense of mission to save the bilateral rela-
tionship with the US, in the first meeting with Governor Ōta in Tokyo on 
September 19, obstinately refused revision, which led to a further escala-
tion of protests in Okinawa. The same stance was also taken by the PM’s 
closest aide, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Nosaka Kōken (Ryūkyū Shin-
po, 1995.9.20). Kōno was unmoved, fearing that revision of SOFA might 
lead to the withdrawal of US forces from Japan (Funabashi 1999, p. 304). 
MOFA bureaucrats supported Kōno’s stance, while he faced opposition 
from the coalition partners, the SPJ and New Party Sakigake.15 In the end, 
the Japanese government agreed not to revise SOFA. Prime Minister Mu-
15 Even some LDP members, such as Ono Yoshinori, chairperson of LDP’s Defense 
Caucus, were in favor of the revision. 
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rayama himself refrained from commenting on the matter saying that it 
was under the foreign minister’s jurisdiction. Within the ruling coalition, 
the demand for SOFA revision was voiced openly by Kubo Wataru, the 
secretary general of the SPJ, who argued that not doing it would compli-
cate the base issue even more, while the leader of New Party Sakigake and 
Finance Minister, Takemura Masayoshi, posed a provocative but rather 
rhetorical question whether Japan was in fact independent. In Okinawa 
the protests escalated even further. On October 21, a  crowd of 85,000 
Okinawans gathered to protest against the rape and SOFA in Okinawa, 
the biggest such rally since the land struggle in the 1950s. 
Nevertheless, the question of SOFA revision was settled down as an 
implementation review of SOFA, in accordance with the position of top 
decision makers on both sides, the US State and Defense Departments, 
and Japan’s MOFA and DA. On October 25, in a US–Japan meeting in 
Tokyo, it was formally agreed that in case of violent crimes such as mur-
der and rape, “the United States will give sympathetic consideration” to 
any request for the transfer of suspects into Japanese custody before in-
dictment (The New York Times, 1995.10.26). As for the Japanese govern-
ment, the internal conflict was mediated by Hashimoto Ryūtarō, elected 
the LDP president in October 1995, during a meeting of coalition party 
leaders on November 2, and so the Japanese government maintained the 
official stance of not revising SOFA in spite of the intra coalition disagree-
ment.
Bases
The second issue of military bases became particularly pertinent after 
Governor Ota announced his refusal to sign proxy for lease of land for US 
military bases on August 28 (Bochorodycz 2010, pp. 93–95). This time 
the conflict ran along ministerial and not national lines. From the start, 
the US Department of State and Japanese MOFA were strongly against 
handling the issue of the bases, while the US Defense Department and 
Japanese counter partners, the DA, strongly in favor, as were the political 
leaders PM Murayama and PM Hashimoto, not to the mention the gov-
ernor of Okinawa. 
According to Funabashi (1999), the Asahi Shinbun journalist, who 
conducted extensive interviews with all major actors involved in the pro-
cess, over a  long period of time, it was actually two high level officials 
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from the DA, Akiyama Masahiro, director general of Defense Bureau, and 
Moriya Takemasa, a counselor (shingikan) for the Defense Bureau divi-
sion, who took up the initiative in regard to the bases. Their main concern 
was the preservation of the alliance itself and limitation of the impact of 
the refusal for proxy signing over the land use by Governor Ōta. Akiyama 
contacted Nye directly proposing to set up a joint commission on return-
ing the bases, and sent Hirasawa Katsuei, DA counselor (a  parliament 
member from October 1996) to Washington, who discussed the situation 
with Curt Campbell, deputy assistant secretary of defense. Nye drafted 
a proposal about conveying a new forum for discussion and Secretary of 
Defense William Perry added requirements of bilateralism and involve-
ment of both military and civilians, and preparation of a proposal with 
a specific deadline (Funabashi 1999, pp. 308–309).16 
In the other camp, MOFA bureaucrats against SACO revision and han-
dling of the bases, were arguing that there already was a forum to discuss 
such issues (the US–Japan Joint Committee), and furthermore that SOFA 
was under the jurisdiction of MOFA and not the DA. The DA top offi-
cials counter argued that MOFA had not been able to assess operational 
functions of the bases and incorporate them into demands toward the US, 
which was the reason the issue of the bases had been unresolved for years 
(Funabashi 1999, pp. 318–319).17 The turf battle continued between min-
istries, while the political leaders of both institutions shared views of the 
bureaucrats under their jurisdiction. SACO became a chance to establish 
a new mechanism for the two institutions to cooperate on the base issue. 
On November 1, 1995, DA Director–General Etō Seishirō and Defense 
Secretary William Perry, who arrived in Tokyo, in a joint press release an-
nounced the “realignment, consolidation and reduction” of the US bases, 
emphasizing at the same time that the overall US troop strength in the 
Asia–Pacific would remain at 100,000 with 47,000 in Japan, which was 
compatible with the US policy announced in January 1995, known as the 
Nye Initiative.18 On November 20, Prime Minister Murayama and Vice 
President Al Gore, at the APEC meeting in Japan, announced the estab-
16 In the end, the proposal for inclusion of local representatives was not implemented. 
17 On the other hand, some bureaucrats within JDA were reluctant to tackle the issue 
of bases, seeing it as new and difficult task, first of negotiating with landowners, and 
also finding new relocation sites.
18 It is a name of a report, officially known as The United States Strategy for the East 
Asia Pacific Region, prepared by the Assistant Secretary of Defense John Nye and 
released in February 1995.
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lishment of SACO,19 which was to investigate ways to reduce the impact of 
the US military bases in Okinawa. On the following day in Tokyo, the first 
meeting of SACO was held with Orita Masaki of the MOFA North Amer-
ican Bureau and Akiyama Masahiro of the DA Defense Policy Bureau, and 
their US counterparts, Winston Lord, the US Assistant Secretary of State 
for Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Joseph Nye, the US Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Affairs. The inaugural session was also attended 
exceptionally by Foreign Minister Kōno Yōhei, DA Director–General Etō 
Seishirō and the US Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale, who were not 
formally members of SACO.20 The SACO interim report was ready by April 
1996, and the final report announced in December 1996. It proposed a re-
turn of 21% of the bases in 11 military facilities. The final report outlined 
the requirements of land return, adjustment of procedures for training and 
operational procedures, noise abatement and changes of SOFA. The chang-
es looked substantial, but many of the items included were part of earlier 
petitions and agreements, and so the question was rather of the implemen-
tation than the planning (Funabashi 1999, pp. 24–25; Bochorodycz 2005; 
Moriya 2010, loc. 4214). The SACO deliberations took place and the re-
ports were submitted under the next Hashimoto Cabinet. While leaving of-
fice Murayama supposedly said to Hashimoto that “Okinawa is my greatest 
regret. It’s the only thing I ask of you,” to which Hashimoto responded with 
assurance that it was also his greatest concern (in Funabashi 1999, p. 29). 
Both were probably indeed concerned about the issue, but both perceived 
the solutions most probably quite differently. 
6. Hashimoto Cabinet
The cabinet of Hashimoto Ryūtarō was formed on January 11, 1996, 
still in coalition with the SPJ, renamed few days later to SDPJ, and New 
Party Sakigake (Shintō Sakigake). As a result of the Lower House election 
19 The members were to include director–general of the Defense Bureau and the chair-
man of the Joint Staff Council from JDA, and North American Bureau director–gen-
eral from MOFA, while US participants came from the State Department, the De-
fense Department, the Joint Chief of Staff, the Pacific Forces and the high command 
of the US forces in Japan.
20 The regular members included: Director–General of MOFA’s North American Bu-
reau, JDA’s Director–General of the Bureau of Defense Policy, Director–General of 
the Defense Facilities Agency, and Chairman of the Joint Staff Council of the Japan 
Self–Defense Forces.
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in October 1996, however, the position of the LDP in the coalition was 
strengthened even further, while the SDPJ’s weakened to the point of mar-
ginalization: the SDPJ decreased its seats from 70 to 15, while the LDP 
increased its share from 223 to 239. By the time Hashimoto took up the 
post, the issue of SOFA and the bases was already set on the negotiation 
agenda, the SACO committee was preparing proposals, although the de-
tails were to be decided yet. 
Before going into detailed analysis of the decision process under PM 
Hashimoto, it is instructive to look at an article from the New York Times 
titled “U.S. Will Return Base in Okinawa” published on April 13, 1996, 
one day after the public announcement of the Futenma return, which is 
representative of the understanding of the issue at the time by the public. 
In a landmark move to scale back the intrusiveness of the American military pres-
ence in Japan, the United States agreed tonight to return a major American air base 
to Japan in five to seven years. […]
“We will be relocating some critical defense capabilities, not only within Japan, 
but some back to the United States,” the official said. 
The announcements, just four days before President Clinton is to arrive in To-
kyo for a state visit, are expected to ease the hostility among Okinawans to the Amer-
ican military bases, which now take up 20 percent of their island. […] 
The Futenma Air Base, the Marine base on Okinawa that was the subject of 
today’s announcement, is a major American military installation and a symbol of the 
American presence on Okinawa. 
The Defense Department apparently concluded that the gains it offered in secu-
rity were outweighed by the antagonisms it bred among Okinawans who lived nearby. 
Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and the American Ambassador to Japan, 
Walter F. Mondale, who made the announcement about Futenma in a  joint news 
conference televised live across Japan, emphasized that virtually all of the functions 
of Futenma would be transferred to other bases in Japan. […]
If it had not been for that rape, the agreement to return Futenma and other land 
on Okinawa almost certainly would not have happened. […]
Mr. Hashimoto had asked President Clinton to return Futenma at their meeting 
in California in February, and today’s announcement represents a major triumph for 
the Prime Minister’s Administration. […]
The United States presumably felt that Futenma is more dispensable than some 
other sites, in part because it is a smaller operation than other well–known American 
bases. 
Summarizing the main points of the article, we could say that the Fut-
enma return 1) was PM Hashimoto’s initiative, who made the request 
towards the US president, 2) the decision was made under pressure of the 
local protests in Okinawa, 3) the US government agreed in order to a) lift 
the burden of the Okinawans, and because b) the base was strategically 
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of relatively small importance, and 4) Futenma’s functions were to be 
transferred outside the prefecture. All of these points, at least partially, are 
subjected to debate. 
The decision to return the Futenma Air Base was announced on April 
12, 1996, at the joint press conference of PM Hashimoto and US Ambas-
sador to Japan, Walter Mondale, as described above. The negotiations of 
the process obviously started much earlier. In preparation for the PM’s of-
ficial visit to the US and meeting with President Clinton, Hashimoto con-
vened a meeting in regard to Futenma Air Station with all bureaucrats in 
charge of the issue, including Deputy Cabinet Secretary Furukawa Sada-
jiro, Hirabayashi Hiroshi – Chief Cabinet Counselor for Foreign Affairs, 
Tanaka Hitoshi – Deputy Director General of MOFA’s North American 
Bureau, Akiyama Masahiro – Director General of the DA’s Defense Policy 
Bureau. The officials were generally against the idea of the PM asking the 
US President for the Futenma return, arguing that the issue was too sen-
sitive for the Americans, that it would undermine Hashimoto’s authority 
as a leader (since he would be forwarding the demands of the Okinawans), 
and that it would have an adverse effect on future discussions on the 
military bases (Funabashi 1999, pp. 6–8).21 Hashimoto agreed with them, 
although as he admitted later, he was hesitating until the very last (Iokibe 
& Miyagi, eds. 2013, pp. 63–66). During PM Hashimoto’s meeting with 
President Clinton in Santa Monica in February 1996, Hashimoto never-
theless touched upon the issue of Futenma invited by the President, who 
initiated the topic. Hashimoto’s statement in response to the President’s 
question about Okinawa is worth quoting because it portrays his state of 
mind at that time: 
To tell you the truth, I’m in an awkward position myself. Were I  to pass on the 
demands of the Okinawan people, it would be for the complete return of Futenma. 
However, bearing in mind the importance of U.S.–Japan security and maintaining 
the functionality of the U.S. armed forces, I realize that that is extremely difficult. 
(Funabashi 1999, p. 21).
The statement greatly confused the Americans because of its vague-
ness, and so it was up to high–level officials, Tanaka Hitoshi and Moriya 
Takemasa, who stayed in the US longer, to clarify the statement after-
21 Some of the LDP “defense tribe” (bōeizoku) members were also against it, arguing 
that it is unreasonable under the unstable the situation on the Korean Peninsula 
(Tamura ed. 1998: 119).
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wards in private talks with the US counter partners. The clarification was 
that the Japanese did ask in fact for the return of Futenma. In the end, 
it was concluded that the Futenma return was the result of Hashimoto’s 
initiative. The main role of PM Hashimoto, as the initiator of the process 
was also emphasized by President Bill Clinton in his speech in the Japa-
nese Diet on April 18, 1996.
The American people profoundly regret the horrible violence done to a young school 
girl there. […] 
In the months since this incident, we have worked with the government of 
Japan to minimize the burden of our military presence on the Japanese people. The 
Joint Action Plan we announced this week calls for the consolidation of our bases in 
Okinawa and a major reduction in inconveniences to the people who live there, like 
noise and training and exercises. […]
I want to say again how much I appreciate the leadership of the Prime Min-
ister and his government and the opportunity the United States has been given to 
do something we probably should have done some time ago. I  thank you for that 
(MOFA 1996.4.18).
The “reluctant initiative” of PM Hashimoto was picked up by the 
American side. After the meeting with Hashimoto in California, President 
Clinton ordered the Secretary of Defense William Perry to explore the pos-
sibility of returning the base. A few days later Washington informed Tokyo 
secretly of such a  possibility if only a  replacement site could be found 
(Woodall 2014, p. 204).22  
On April 15, 1996, that is three days after PM Hashimoto and US 
Ambassador Walter Mondale’s press conference, the SACO interim re-
port was approved at the meeting of the Security Consultative Committee 
(2+2), which confirmed the return of Futenma although the question of 
the relocation site was to appear in the final SACO report published in 
December of the same year. It stipulated that Futenma Air Base will be 
relocated to an off–shore facility in the northern part of Okinawa island. 
After years of negotiations, the FRF plan was agreed on and incorporat-
ed into the “United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implemen-
tation,” announced and approved by PM Koizumi Jun’ichirō on May 1, 
2006, which is the latest up to date (2015) official agreement on the issue. 
In the final version of the plan, the new base with the V–shape runways 
is planned to be built by a landfill method over the coral reef shallows of 
22 It is interesting to note that the first information about the possibility of the Futenma 
return appeared in local newspapers as early as November 1995 (Ryūkyū Shinpō, 
1995.11.1, evening edition).  
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Henoko and the seafloor slopes in Ōura Bay, while 8,000 marines are to 
be relocated to Guam, and the cost of transfer entirely covered by Japanese 
government. 
In the end, the blame for the failure of the negotiations on military 
bases and particularly on Futenma has been put by the ruling elites in 
Japan and the US on “the Head of the Ryūkū Kingdom” (Ryūkyū Ōkoku 
no shuseki), as phrased by Nonaka Hiromu (Miokuriya and Makihara, 
eds. 2012, pp. 234–235), namely on Governor Ōta, who announced  his 
objection to the idea of relocation within the prefecture in February 1998, 
almost two years after the agreement on the return (Tamura ed. 1998, 
p. 121, 134; Funabashi 1999, p. 319). In the meantime, PM Hashimoto 
made several decisions, which were to show his determination to solve 
the Okinawa problem. First of all, Hashimoto met in person with Gov-
ernor Ōta 16 times, which was unprecedented in itself for the PM to 
meet in person with a governor of one prefecture, of which the first time 
was just 12 days after taking up the premiership. Hashimoto prepared 
also a complex institutional framework for the realization of the Futen-
ma relocation, including establishment of several institutions: (a) Coun-
termeasures Headquarters for All Futenma Air Station Return (Futenma 
Hikōjō Zenmen Henkan Tō Mondai Taisaku Honbu) in DFA on May 1, 
(b) Task Force for Resolution of Issues Related to Futenma Air Base Return 
(Futenma Hikōjō Tō no Henkan ni Kakawaru Shomondai no Kaiketsu no 
Tame no Sagyō Iinkai), known as the Task Force for the deliberations on 
Futenma between the government and the prefecture on May 8, (c) Special 
Investigative Committee on Comprehensive Development Countermeas-
ures for Okinawa Prefecture (Okinawa Ken Sōgō Shinkō Taisaku ni Kan 
Suru Tokubetsu Chōsa Kai) within the LDP directly under his jurisdiction 
as the LDP president, chaired by an influential LDP member Katō Kōichi 
on June 18, (d) Discussion Group on Okinawa Municipalities with US 
Military Bases (Okinawa Beigun Kichi Shozai ni Kan Suru Kondan Kai) 
in the form of the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s (Kajiyama Seiroku) private 
advisor committee on August 19. On behalf of the PM, Director General 
of the DA, Usui, negotiated the transfer of the live–fire artillery training 
over Prefectural Route 104 to other municipalities outside Okinawa with 
heads of local governments. Furthermore, Hashimoto announced the 
“Prime Minister’s Statement on Okinawa Problem” on September 10, in 
which he promised several special measures for Okinawa’s development, 
and what is more important, secured a budget for the Futenma reloca-
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tion and the economic policies demanded by Governor Ōta under the 
Okinawa Cosmopolitan Formation Concept, which included all Okinawa 
Free Trade Zone (Okinawa Kokusai Toshi Keisei Kōsō). And finally he 
established the Okinawa Policy Council (Okinawa Seisaku Kyōgikai) on 
September 17, which was to include local representatives and supervise 
the implementation of economic plans. 
The long list of Hashimoto’s decisions clearly demonstrated his in-
volvement in the issue, and at the same time his knowledge of the func-
tioning of different bodies of the government, and also the ability to push 
and coordinate the actors for the implementation of those decisions. In 
other words, he used all formal and informal institutional tools by setting 
up various bodies, which gathered representatives of all agencies involved, 
as well as his party members. Importantly, as should be stressed anew, he 
also secured the budget for all those decisions by closely working with the 
Ministry of Finance.23 Both private advisors to PM Hashimoto, Okamoto 
and Shimokōbe, participated in negotiations with the Okinawan govern-
ment officials on specific economic and military issues. Nevertheless, in 
spite of all those arrangements, Hashimoto took up the initiative and 
made the decision to relocate Futenma, which followed the general lines 
of MOFA’s and the DA’s policy, that is, the prioritization of the Japan–US 
alliance and the maintenance of the “operational readiness” of the US 
army, while the local demand for the relocation outside the prefecture was 
not even set on the deliberation agenda.  
The question as to why Governor Ōta decided to announce opposition 
to the FRF construction so late is complex. While opposing relocation and 
construction of military bases within the prefecture, Ōta tried to use the 
issue of military bases as a bargaining card vis–à–vis the central govern-
ment to implement local economic policies (Okinawa Cosmopolitan City 
Concept, FTZ), which were to make Okinawa economically independent 
from the central government (Bochorodycz 2010). The local communi-
ty has been deeply divided over the issue of the military bases, the gap, 
which widened especially after financial and other benefits were poured 
in by the national government (Inoue 2007, pp. 186–193). Nevertheless, 
the opposition among local citizens to any solution involving relocation 
23 Funabashi reports that one of the first calls after the decision on the Futenma relo-
cation was made by Hashimoto and Komura Takeshi, general director of the Budget 
Bureau at the Ministry of Finance to secure the budget for his decision (Funabashi 
1999, p. 5). 
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within the prefecture or a construction of new bases has been strong. For 
the Okinawans, the Futenma problem is just a part of the bigger problem 
of the military bases, while both governments present it as the problem, 
putting the blame for the stalemate on the local side. Interestingly, in the 
discourse, Ōta and the local groups are criticized for being “ungrateful” for 
all the efforts done by the central government (Funabashi 1999, p. 154). 
7. Conclusion
Prime Minister Murayama although initially showed strong initiative 
in regard to a  solution of the US military bases (SACO etc.), devolved 
almost all responsibility to Foreign Minister Kōno Yōhei, the president of 
the LDP (till October 1995). Murayama was lacking experience with min-
isterial posts and interest in foreign relations, as well as political resources 
as the minor coalition partner. The issue of SOFA revision was handled 
according to the stance of Kōno–MOFA policy, namely of no revision, only 
interpretation and implementation of the agreement. Both sides, foreign 
minister and MOFA’s top officials shared the same stance toward the is-
sue. This ran along the policy lines of the US Department of Defense and 
State. 
On the other hand, the issue of the bases presented a different case, 
and the conflict ran along the institutional, and not the national lines. 
Japanese MOFA and US Department of State were strongly against tack-
ling the base issue. The initiative actually came from DA bureaucrats 
(Akiyama, Moriya) with strong support from the US Department of 
Defense (Nye, Perry), who acknowledged the problematic aspect of the 
military base concentration in Okinawa. The Department of Defense 
was fully aware of the necessity to redefine the US–Japan alliance af-
ter the end of the Cold War, and the deliberations in this regard were 
undertaken, but due to Japanese MOFA’s negative stance, the US State 
Department followed the line. For MOFA, the US bases in Japan were 
the strongest bargaining card in bilateral security discussions (Funabashi 
1999, p. 316). Nye took up the initiative preparing a policy proposal to 
be known as the Nye Initiative in January 1995, but not until the rape 
incident and domestic upheavals surfaced would the MOFA–US State 
Department’s inertia be overcome. The rape incident provided the US 
Department of Defense and Japanese DA with a window of opportunity 
for a policy change. The issue of the “American factor” in the decision–
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making process has been analyzed in this article only selectively as far 
as it was necessary for explaining the actions of the Japanese actors. It 
would be therefore also enlightening to see the political dynamics on 
the US side, while remembering that the “American factor” or “foreign 
pressure,” referred to in Japanese as gaistsu, has been used by Japanese 
political actors (e.g., MOFA vs. DA/MOD) to justify and push the poli-
cies against which objections are expected.
Summing up, PM Hashimoto, who took the post in the midst of 
the ongoing negotiations on the US military bases, showed strong initi-
ative in regard to Futenma, picking up the issue from the fixed agenda, 
and under conditions that were satisfactory to DA officials and the US 
counter partners from the Pentagon – that is, the transfer within the 
prefecture that would not actually alter the situation of the US bases but 
rather enhance it by providing a new and upgraded facility, paid entirely 
by the Japanese government. But the solution was not satisfactory for 
the local government or the majority of local citizens. In negotiations 
between central and local governments, PM Hashimoto relied strongly 
on formal and informal tools, such as special advisors (Shimokōbe, Oki-
moto), but only to determine the specifics of the agreement, which the 
general agenda (Futenma relocation within the prefecture) had already 
been set up. Moreover, the local protests seem to have had effects only 
on the rhetorical aspect and finances. The bigger the protest, the more 
often officials expressed their remorse and gratitude to Okinawa and 
larger budgets were assigned for Okinawa development. Nevertheless, 
Hashimoto seems to have come the closest to the ideal type of a leader 
capable of solving the problem of Okinawa military bases, possessing: 
first, political will to solve the problem; second, political resources (his 
own position within the LDP, and the LDP’s position in the coalition 
and the Diet); third, managerial skills and experience to use and coop-
erate with bureaucrats; and fourth, ability to use formal and informal 
institutions for the realization of his decisions. The only missing ele-
ment, which might have led to the resolution of the issue in a satisfac-
tory manner also for the majority of Okinawans, was, as it seems at the 
moment, the will to move the bases outside Okinawa. One can assume, 
given the present international situation, that only a leader with similar 
skills and resources as Hashimoto, and in addition with the will to move 
the bases outside the prefecture, might be able to bring a solution to the 
long–standing deadlock.
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